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1. INTRODUCTION 
This is the nineteenth annual report on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in EU lawmaking. It is presented in accordance with Article 9 of the Protocol 
(No 2) on the application of these principles (hereinafter ‘the Protocol’) attached to the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
As in previous years, the report looks at how the principles are implemented by the different 
EU institutions and bodiesthe Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Committee of the Regions and presents in more detail some Commission initiatives and 
legislative proposals which have raised subsidiarity issues during 2011. It also examines how 
the subsidiarity control mechanism, which under Article 12 of the TEU and the Protocol gives 
national Parliaments a particular role in scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity, has 
developed since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Given the close links between the 
subsidiarity control mechanisms and the political dialogue between national Parliaments and 
the Commission, this report should be seen as complementary to the Commission's annual 
report for 2011 on relations with national Parliaments 1. 
2. HOW THE INSTITUTIONS APPLY THE PIRNCIPLES 
Decisions as to whether to propose action at EU level (subsidiarity) and, if so, the extent and 
formof such action (proportionality) are fundamental to smart regulation2. All EU institutions 
and bodies have to comply with both principles.  
A careful assessment of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality during the pre-
legislative phase is important ensuring that proposals are appropriately conceived. At the post-
legislative stage, the Court of Justice could be called on to controlthe legality of adopted 
legislation. So far, the Court has not annulled a measure for breach of the subsidiarity 
principle. 
It is imperative to make the arguments on subsidiarity and proportionality transparent, as this 
enables the various institutional players as well as the public at large to discuss the validity of 
the proposal constructively. Therefore, in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol and 
irrespective of where the initiative originates, a draft legislative act should contain a detailed 
‘statement’ making it possible for the interested parties to judge compliance with the 
principle. Although subsidiarity cannot be assessed mechanically by reference to operational 
                                                 
1 COM(2012) 375 
2 Wider smart regulation issues were addressed in the Commission Communication COM(2010)543 
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criteria, the Commission continues to use ‘necessity’ and ‘EU value-added’ tests as part of its 
analytical framework and recommends that others do likewise.  
2.1. The Commission 
As the author of legislative proposals under its right of initiative, the Commission works to 
ensure that the correct choices about whether and how to propose EU level action are made at 
an early stage of policy development.  
Roadmaps3, which are published for all the major initiatives, outline the Commission’s 
intentions, including an initial subsidiarity and proportionality justification. These ideas are 
verified later during both stakeholder consultation and the impact assessment (IA) process. 
The subsidiarity statement for each legislative proposal, as foreseen by Article 5 of the 
Protocol, is presented in the explanatory memorandum and recalled in the recitals of the 
proposal. IAs, which accompany proposals with significant impacts, provide the most detailed 
analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality. The quality of this analysis is systematically 
scrutinised by the IA Board. 
In 2011, the Board continued to assess EU added value when scrutinising the quality of IAs. 
Though the Board's recommendations on subsidiarity and proportionality were down slightly 
compared to 2010, they still featured in a significant number of opinions (43 %). The Board 
frequently asked for stronger justification of the need for action at EU level, in particular: 
— the need for more evidence of problems that require action at EU level. As regards the 
initiative on Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Board requested a better demonstration of the 
existence and magnitude of market failure and its relevance for the functioning of the internal 
market. Similarly, in the case of the EU Strategy for the protection and welfare of animals, 
the Board asked that the problems associated with EU competence, such as distortion of 
competition on the internal market, be better distinguished from those other problems where 
action at Member State level would be more appropriate.  
— on some occasions it concluded that the evidence base to demonstrate the need for and 
proportionality of an EU legislative initiative remained weak for instance in the case of the 
above mentioned initiative on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which estimated that 'there was 
not sufficient clarity on the costs and benefits of a full EU coverage ADR [alternative dispute 
resolution] at both European and Member State level’ .Similarly, concerning the initiative on 
access to a basic payment account, the Board's view was that there remained a need to 
demonstrate more convincingly the need for, and the proportionality of, a binding EU 
instrument. Services introduced Board's comments into the final IA report.  
2.2. National Parliaments 
The subsidiarity control mechanism gives national Parliaments the right to express their views 
on whether draft legislative acts, which do not fall within the EU's exclusive competences 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Depending on the number of reasoned opinions 
                                                 
3 Access to roadmaps is via the Commission’s IA Website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm. 
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concluding that a proposal is in breach of the subsidiarity principle4, i.e. if the thresholds 
mentioned in Article 7 of the Protocol are met within the eight-week deadline, the so-called 
‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ can be triggered. These entail a review of the draft legislation 
and may lead to the relevant legislative proposal being amended or withdrawn.  
In 2011, the Commission received 64 reasoned opinions from national Parliaments, an 
increase of almost 75% in comparison with 2010, the first year of functioning of the 
subsidiarity control mechanism. Despite this increase, these 64 reasoned opinions still 
represent only about 10% of the total number of 622 opinions received by the Commission in 
2011 as part of its broader political dialogue with national Parliaments. 
As in the first year of application of the new subsidiarity control mechanism, the focus of 
national Parliaments' reasoned opinions remains quite disparate: the 64 reasoned opinions 
received in 2011 related to 28 different Commission proposals. Most of the reasoned opinions 
focused on legislative proposals in the fields of taxation, agriculture, internal market and 
justice. The proposals which elicited the highest number of reasoned opinions concerned the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (nine opinions), the temporary reintroduction of 
border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances (six), the Common European 
Sales Law (five) and the Single CMO Regulation (five). The national Parliaments most active 
in issuing reasoned opinions were the SwedishRiksdag, the Luxembourg Chambre des 
Députés (lower chamber and the Polish Sejm and Senat (lower and upper chambers).  
In none of the 2011 cases were the thresholds for triggering the yellow or orange cards met. 
Apart from the above mentioned files, the vast majority of the 28 legislative proposals on 
which national Parliaments issued reasoned opinions in 2011 elicited at most three reasoned 
opinions. As per to its political commitment to national Parliaments, the Commission replied 
or is in the process of preparing a reply to each reasoned opinion in the context of the political 
dialogue and put forward into account in the ensuing interinstitutional discussions and 
negotiations.  
Each national Parliament chooses its own internal procedure for adopting reasoned opinions 
and the format in which these are sent to the Commission. This is reflected in the huge 
diversity of formats, length, detail and of the actors involved in the adoption process. Given 
that the political dialogue and the subsidiarity control mechanism unavoidably overlap to a 
certain extent, the only request President Barroso addressed to national Parliaments in his 
letter of 1 December 20095 was "to distinguish in their opinions as far as possible between 
subsidiarity aspects and comments on the substance of a proposal, and to be as clear as 
possible as regards their assessment on a proposal's compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity". The Commission will continue to emphasise this latter point in its contacts with 
national Parliaments. 
Apart from the more formal aspects, the content and reasoning of the reasoned opinions sent 
to the Commission in 2011 also varied. In several cases, national Parliaments used substantive 
arguments to justify a breach of subsidiarity, such as the potential negative effects of a 
                                                 
4 A reasoned opinion is defined as an opinion sent by a national Parliament to the Commission (or the 
European Parliament, the Council , Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the European 
Investment Bank – depending on which institution has proposed the respective legislation) within the 
eight weeks period mentioned in the Protocol and stating a breach of subsidiarity.  
5 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_fr.htm 
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proposed measure on the overall economic situation, while other based their conclusions on 
subsidiarity and proportionality arguments or on an allegedly incorrect or unspecified legal 
basis. Finally, national Parliaments in several cases used a reasoned opinion to express their 
opposition to the proposed use of delegated acts in a certain area or to the lack of subsidiarity 
justification in the explanatory memorandum (see chapter 3.1.). As stated in the above 
mentioned letter of President Barroso, the Commission will "consider all reasoned opinions 
raising objections as to the conformity of a legislative proposal with the principle of 
subsidiarity (…), even if the different reasoned opinions provide different motivations as to 
the non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity". In line with its interpretation of the 
subsidiarity control mechanism, the Commission considers that the issuance of a reasoned 
opinion on a Commission proposal and the arguments on which it is based, fall solely within 
the responsibility of each national Parliament.  
As some reasoned opinions received in 2011 highlighted insufficient or missing subsidiarity 
justifications and some have concluded that this constitutes a formal breach of the subsidiarity 
principle, the Commission reiterates its commitment to ensure that the explanatory 
memoranda of all legislative proposals within the scope of the subsidiarity control mechanism 
contain an appropriate subsidiarity justification.  
2.3. The European Parliament and the Council 
The legislators also have a responsibility to ensure the proposal’s conformity with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and to provide a justification wherever an 
amendment they propose affects the scope of EU action.6  
In Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) ensures that the principles 
are complied with.7 In the European Parliament, the internal Rules of Procedure contain a 
specific Rule on the "Examination of respect for the principle of subsidiarity"8, which states 
that compliance is verified by the committees in charge of specific legislative dossiers, 
together with the Committee on Legal Affairs, and that the committee responsible may not 
take its final vote before expiry of the eight-week deadline. 
It should also be noted that in 2011 the Commission received a small number of parliamentary 
questions (32 out of more than 12 000) which concerned issues in relation to respect for the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. They mainly covered requests to substantiate 
the compliance of certain Commission proposals with these principles, partially echoing 
concerns raised by other institutions and players. 
                                                 
6 See the Inter-Institutional Agreement on subsidiarity (OJ C 329, 6.12.1993, p. 132). 
7 Council Decision 2009/937/EU, OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35. 
8 Rule 38a  
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2.4. The Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the Regions expresses its views either when it is consulted or in the form of 
own-initiative opinions. In accordance with Article 8 of the Protocol, it also has the right to 
challenge under Article 263 TFEU the validity of legislation as regards compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, but only if it has been consulted by virtue of an obligation under the 
TFEU. 
The Committee's subsidiarity monitoring is expressed either via its opinions, the activities of 
the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network (SMN) or via contributions which regional parliaments 
with legislative powers provided to national Parliaments under the subsidiarity control 
mechanism. The way in which regional Parliaments with legislative powers are consulted by 
their national Parliaments varies and in this regard the eight-week deadline poses a major 
challenge. A few regional Parliaments have started to send their subsidiarity opinions directly 
to the Commission for information.  
Though it observed no subsidiarity breach in 2011, the Committee has reinforced the 
references to the principle in its opinions and plans to increase the number of subsidiarity 
assessments included in its final opinions. It continues to use its subsidiarity and 
proportionality analysis grid.  
The Committee's Subsidiarity Monitoring Network (SMN) included by the end of the year 
2011 134 partners. This represents a significant increase in particular as regards regional 
parliaments and governments. In 2011 the SMN conducted targeted consultations on five 
Commission proposals (Connecting Europe Facility; Less Bureaucracy for citizens; Review 
of EU Air Quality and Emissions policy; Energy Efficiency and Roma Integration9). It also 
launched the second Action Plan focused on TEN-T policy with the aim of identifying best 
practices in the application of the subsidiarity principle in Europe’s regions and cities.  
2011 also saw preparations for the launch of the REGPEX website, which is designed to help 
regions with legislative powers play their part in the subsidiarity control mechanism and to 
provide a source of information and exchange between regional parliaments and governments 
as they prepare their subsidiarity analyses. The website was launched in March 201210.  
Finally, the revised Agreement on Cooperation between the European Commission and the 
Committee of the Regions, on which negotiations started in 2011 and which was signed on 16 
February 201211, reflects a willingness to strengthen further cooperation and exchanges in 
terms of implementing of the Protocol. 
2.5. The Court of Justice  
The Court of Justice of the European Union is, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, 
competent to review the legality of legislative acts as regards compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. The Protocol states that the Committee of the Regions or Member States, 
themselves or on behalf of their national Parliaments, can bring a case before the Court.  
                                                 
9 COM(2011)665, COM(2010)747, SEC(2011)342, COM(2011)370 and 173 respectively 
10 http://extranet.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/regpex/Pages/default.aspx 
11 http://cor.europa.eu/en/about/interinstitutional/Documents/EN.pdf 
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A judgment Luxembourg vs Parliament and the Council12confirmed what was already noticed 
in the ruling on the Roaming Regulation13 , covered in 2009 report. In examining complianace 
with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, the Court will look to the 
Commission's impact assessment.  
3. KEY CASES WHERE SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY CONCERNS WERE RAISED 
This section looks at the Commission proposals which have generated the most discussion on 
subsidiarity and proportionality. 
3.1. Follow-up to cases mentioned in previous reports 
For some of the cases mentioned in earlier reports, such as the Directives on Aviation Security 
Charges,14 Protection of Soil,15 Equal Treatment outside Employment16 andCultivation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms there were no significant developments in the ongoing 
legislative procedures during 2011. On the Seasonal Workers Directive, discussions continued 
in the EP and Council without issues related to subsidiarity or proportionality being raised.  
As regards the Maternity Leave Directive,17 mentioned in the 2008 report, the legislators have 
not yet managed to find common ground. At the Employment, Social Policy, Health and 
Consumer Affairs Council in June 2011, the Council took note of a progress report which 
notes the concerns of some delegations calling for due consideration be given to the principle 
of subsidiarity and the diversity of the situations in the different Member States. Some 
delegations at the meeting recalled the minuted statement by eight delegations at the 
December 2010 Council, proposing that each Member State should be free to decide on the 
level of protection while respecting certain minimum requirements, in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity. There were some voices calling for the Council to discontinue its work on this 
topic. 
During the inter-institutional discussions in December 2011 an agreement was found on the 
proposal concerning Food Distribution to the Most Deprived People, which had elicited 3 
reasoned opinions from national Parliaments in 2010. The European Parliament expressed its 
strong support for continuing the programme beyond 2013. The Council also reached a 
political agreement on continuing the scheme up to 2013. In its declaration, the Commission 
took note of the opinion of a significant group of Member States not to pursue the programme 
beyond 2013. However, this is without prejudice to the Commission's right of initiative under 
the Treaty. 
The plenary session of the European Parliament in February 2012 adopted a report on the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme proposal, on which a first reading agreement had not been 
                                                 
12 Case C-176/09,  
13 Case C-58/8 Vodafone Ltd, Telefónica O2 Europe plc, T-Mobile International AG, Orange Personal 
Communications Services Ltd v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
about EC Regulation No 717/2007 
14 COM(2009) 217. Here and afterwards, details on inter-institutional discussion are accessible via PreLex 
database: http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm. 
15 COM(2006) 232. 
16 COM(2008) 426. 
17 COM (2008) 637. 
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possible. This proposal elicited 3 reasoned opinions from national Parliaments in 2010. 
Nevertheless, both the rapporteur, Mr Simon (S&D/DE), and the Danish Presidency of the 
Council expressed their willingness to pursue negotiations with a view to concluding an early 
second reading agreement. 
Finally, the Consumer Rights Directive was formally adopted by the Council in October 2011.  
3.2. Further cases where subsidiarity was debated 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)18 
In March 2011 the Commission proposed a common system for calculating the tax base of 
businesses operating in the EU. The aim of this proposal is to reduce significantly the 
administrative burden, transfer pricing compliance costs, allow cross-border relief of tax 
losses and tackle legal uncertainties which businesses in the EU currently face by dealing with 
up to 27 different national systems for determining their taxable profits.  
This proposal attracted the highest number of opinions from national Parliaments during 
2011, eliciting in total17 opinions, nine of which were reasoned opinions according to the 
Protocol, namely arguing that the proposal was in breach of the subsidiarity principle. As the 
reasoned opinions received represented only 13 votes, the so–called "yellow card procedure", 
which requires at least 18 votes, was not triggered.  
In addition to alleged shortfalls in the subsidiarity justification, several national Parliaments 
were concerned that the proposal was regulating an area of Member State competence. They 
claimed that it would negatively affect Member States as they would not be entitled to use 
corporate tax as an instrument for boosting growth and employment. They consiodered that it 
would deprive the Member States of their individual competitive advantages and would 
generate indirect pressure on national tax rates, leading to budgetary erosion and a decrease in 
tax revenues. In addition, two reasoned opinions raised the issue of proportionality claiming 
that the proposal went further than necessary leading to two different corporate tax systems 
which would result in unnecessary administrative burden. 
In its replies to national Parliaments, the Commission pointed out that the present area of 
taxation falls under shared competence and that Article 115 TFEU provides the legal base for 
measures in this area. It is on this basis that the Commission adopted draft legislation with the 
aim of tackling fiscal impediments and disparities mainly resulting from the fragmentation of 
the internal Union market into 27 distinct tax systems. Businesses are faced with those 
obstacles when they operate within the internal market. The CCCTB is expected to generate 
savings for companies thus encouraging cross-border expansion not only of existing 
multinational groups but also of purely domestic companies, including SMEs which currently 
cannot afford to establish themselves accros the border. Therefore, the CCCTB aims at 
generating positive scale effects and at encouraging cross-border business investment. 
Moreover, the Commission emphasised that the proposal does not affect the Member States' 
sovereignty to set tax rates individually, as this is left to be dealt with through national 
legislation. 
                                                 
18 COM(2011)121 
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The proposal, falling under a special legislative procedure is currently under discussion in the 
Council.The European Parliament gave a favourable opinion to the proposal on 19 April 
2012. 
Temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders in exceptional 
circumstances19 
The proposal for a regulation adopted in September 2011, building on the conclusions of the 
European Council in June 2011, is intended to strengthen the governance of the area without 
internal border controls (the Schengen area). It aims to enable it to respond effectively to 
exceptional circumstances which would put the overall functioning of Schengen cooperation 
at risk, without, however, jeopardising the principle of free movement of persons. 
The Commission received 11 opinions from national Parliaments on this proposal, 6 of which 
were reasoned opinions. National Parliaments argued that the proposal encroaches on the 
sphere of national sovereignty of Member States, which are better placed to assess and decide 
on the possible reintroduction of border controls. Moreover, some national Parliaments 
considered that compliance with the subsidiarity principle was not appropriately justified. 
Arguments raised by national Parliaments were also echoed in the Council discussions on this 
proposal. 
In its replies to those national Parliaments which had raised subsidiarity concerns, the 
Commission focused on the fact that the Schengen area is an asset shared by the whole EU, so 
any decision affecting it must be taken at EU level and not individually. The rules governing 
the creation and maintenance of such an area without internal frontiers are the subject of EU 
legislation, and any exceptions to the principle of free movement should be made at that level. 
The Commission also argued that the proposal fully respects the sovereign responsibility of 
Member States with regard to maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.  
Passenger Name Records20 
The Commission received ten opinions from national Parliaments on this proposal, the 
majority concluding that the Commission proposal was in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity. However, five chambers considered the proposal not to be in compliance with 
the principle of proportionality due to the perceived disproportionate length of the proposed 
data retention period.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
As in previous years, the majority of Commission proposals were adopted by the co-
legislators without significant discussions on subsidiarity and proportionality. In 2011 the 
thresholds for the so-called "yellow card" and "orange card" were not reached and only a 
small percentage (about 10%) of national Parliaments' opinions sent to the Commission in the 
context of the political dialogue were reasoned opinions within the meaning of the Protocol, 
i.e. stating a breach of subsidiarity. At the same time, in cases where compliance with the 
                                                 
19 COM(2011)560 
20 COM(2011)32 
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principles of subsidiarity and proportionality was questioned, the views of the institutions and 
other players involved sometimes differed widely.  
The concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality are fundamental elements in the policy 
development process of the EU Institutions; and the Commission's impact assessments remain 
the main vehicle for addressing subsidiarity and proportionality issues during the pre-
legislative phase, the IA Board playing a key role in this respect. However, institutional 
practice shows that the way these principles are interpreted and applied during the legislative 
phase often depends on the political context, highlighting thus their political dimension.  
The way in which most of the national Parliaments implement the Protocol and use the 
subsidiarity control mechanism has highlighted the primarily political character of this new 
tool, a fact, which the Commission had already highlighted in President Barroso's letter of 1 
December 2009.  
The subsidiarity control mechanism has served to make the process more transparent and has 
clearly helped to bring EU policies into the public debate in Member States and thus to raise 
public awareness on these issues. 
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ANNEX 
List of Commission initiatives on which  
national Parliaments delivered reasoned opinions 
on the subsidiarity principle in 2011 
 Title National chambers submitting reasoned opinions 
1. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB), COM(2011)121 
UK House of Commons  
BG Narodno Sabranie 
SE Riksdag  
NL Tweede Kamer 
PL Sejm 
ML Kamra tad-Deputati 
IE Dail Eireann 
RO Camera Deputaţilor 
SK Národná Rada 
2. Temporary reintroduction of border 
control at internal borders in exceptional 
circumstances, COM(2011)560 
FR Assemblée nationale 
Both NL Chambers 
PO Assembleia da República 
SE Riksdag  
RO Senatul 
SK Národná Rada 
3. Single CMO regulation, COM(2010)799 PL Sejm 
PL Senat 
DK Folketing  
LU Chambre des Députés 
SE Riksdag  
4. Common European Sale Law, 
COM(2011)635 
AT Bundesrat 
DE Bundestag 
UK House of Commons 
BE Sénat 
BE Chambre des Représentants 
5. Jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions 
regarding the property consequences of 
registered partnerships, COM(2011)127 
PL Senat 
PL Sejm 
RO Senatul 
IT Senato della Repubblica 
6. Prudential requirements for credit 
institutions, COM(2011)452 
UK House of Commons 
SE Riksdag 
FR Sénat 
7. Common Financial Transaction Tax, 
COM(2011)594 
CY Vouli ton Antiprosopon 
SE Riksdag 
MT Kamra tad-Deputati 
8. European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
(2014 - 2020), COM(2011)608 
Both NL Chambers 
SE Riksdag  
DK Folketing 
9. Specific requirements regarding statutory 
audit of public-interest entities - 
COM(2011)779 
BE Chambre des Représentants 
SK Národná Rada 
SE Riksdag 
10. Marketing standards, COM(2010)738 LU Chambre des Députés 
PL Senat 
11. Restructuring the Community framework 
for the taxation of energy products and 
electricity, COM(2011)169 
BG Narodno Sabranie  
Both ES Chambers 
 EN 12   EN 
12. Enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection, 
COM(2011)215 and in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection with 
regard to the applicable translation 
arrangements, COM(2011)216 
IT Camera dei Deputati 
Both ES Chambers 
13. Energy efficiency directive, 
COM(2011)370 
FI Eduskunta 
SE Riksdag 
14. Access to the activity and the 
supplementary supervision of credit 
institutions, insurance firms in a financial 
conglomerate, COM(2011)453 
SE Riksdag  
RO Camera Deputaţilor 
15. Rules for direct payments to farmers 
under support schemes within the 
framework of the common agricultural 
policy, COM(2011)625 
DE Bundesrat 
LU Chambre des Députés 
16. Support for rural development by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD), COM(2011)627 
DE Bundesrat (joint with the reasoned opinion on 
COM(2011)625) 
LU Chambre des Députés 
17. Regulation on the distribution of food 
products to the most deprived persons in 
the Union, COM(2011)634 
SE Riksdag 
UK House of Lords 
18. Contractual relations in the milk and milk 
products sector, COM(2010)728 
PL Sejm 
19. Financing of the common agricultural 
policy, COM(2010)745 
PL Senat 
20. Jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, COM(2010)748 
Both NL Chambers 
21. Interconnection of central, commercial 
and companies registers, COM(2011)79 
PL Sejm 
22. Jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions 
in matters of matrimonial property 
regimes, COM(2011)126 
IT Senato della Repubblica 
23. Food intended for infants and young 
children and on food for special medical 
purposes, COM(2011)353 
IT Senato della Repubblica 
24. Definition, description, presentation, 
labelling and the protection of 
geographical indications of
 aromatised wine products, 
COM(2011)530 
LU Chambre des Députés 
25. Information exchange mechanism with 
regard to intergovernmental agreements 
between Member States and third 
countries in the field of energy, 
COM(2011)540 
LU Chambre des Députés 
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26. European Union Programme for Social 
Change and Innovation, COM(2011)609 
SE Riksdag  
27. Specific provisions concerning the 
European Regional Development Fund 
and the Investment for growth and jobs 
goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1080/2006, COM(2011)614 
LU Chambre des Députés  
28. Common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by 
the Common Strategic Framework and 
laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1083/2006, COM(2011)615 
IT Camera dei Deputati 
 
